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In traditional markets, firms can charge prices that are significantly elevated 
relative to their costs only if there is a market failure. However, this is not true in a 
two-sided market (like Amazon, Uber, and Mastercard), in which firms often subsi-
dize one side of the market and generate revenue from the other. This means consid-
eration of one side of the market in isolation is problematic. The Court embraced 
this view in Ohio v American Express, requiring that anticompetitive harm on one 
side of a two-sided market be weighed against benefits on the other side. 
Legal scholars denounce this decision, which, practically, will make it much 
more difficult to wield antitrust as a tool to rein in two-sided markets. This inability 
is concerning as two-sided markets are growing in importance. Furthermore, the 
pricing structures used by platforms can be regressive, with those least well-off sub-
sidizing their affluent and financially sophisticated counterparts. 
In this Essay, I argue that consumer protection, rather than antitrust, is best 
suited to tame two-sided markets. Consumer protection authority allows for inter-
vention on the grounds that platform users create unavoidable externalities for all 
consumers. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has broad power to 
curtail “unfair, abusive, and deceptive practices.” This authority can be used to re-
strict practices that decrease consumer welfare, like the antisteering rules at issue in 
Ohio v American Express. 
INTRODUCTION 
“It’s a two-sided market. I mean, I—I—I’ve never seen such 
jargon.” Justice Stephen Breyer, Oral Argument in Ohio v 
American Express.1 
 
Ohio v American Express2 is regarded as one of the most sig-
nificant antitrust decisions in recent history. American Express’s 
(AmEx’s) business model is based on charging merchants higher 
fees for transaction processing than its competitors.3 It generates 
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 1 Transcript of Oral Argument, Ohio v American Express Co, No 16-1454, *22 (US 
filed Feb 26, 2018) (AmEx Transcript). 
 2 138 S Ct 2274 (2018) (AmEx). 
 3 Id at 2282. 
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significant revenue from these high fees by incentivizing card us-
age through attractive rewards programs.4 Merchants argue that 
they lack the power to bargain with AmEx for lower fees, instead 
receiving only a “take-it-or-leave it” offer—and “leave it” is not an 
option because failure to accept AmEx cards can mean significant 
customer attrition.5 AmEx, understanding this dynamic, raised 
merchant interchange fees significantly in recent years.6 
AmEx contractually prohibits merchants from passing along 
high processing costs to AmEx cardholders, or even mentioning 
the high processing costs associated with their cards.7 In Ohio v 
American Express, acting on the complaints of merchants, several 
states and the federal government challenged this “anti-steering” 
ban as an illegal restraint on competition,8 with the lower court 
finding in their favor because the practice impeded competitor 
networks like Discover from gaining market share by offering 
merchants better deals.9 
AmEx successfully appealed to the Supreme Court, which 
found that, although this restraint may harm merchants, con-
sumers benefited by receiving high rewards for transacting with 
AmEx cards.10 These rewards had to be weighed against the mer-
chant harm and since this balancing had not occurred, the lower 
court erred.11 
The balancing the Court mandates is complex. Card net-
works are two-sided markets: they intermediate between mer-
chants, whom they must convince to accept their cards, and con-
sumers, whom they must convince to use them.12 This means card 
networks must choose not only prices, but also price structures.13 
When a consumer swipes her card, a card network can generate 
revenue in myriad ways. On the consumer side, card networks 
can charge transaction fees. On the merchant side, they can gen-
erate revenue from processing, or “interchange,” fees.14 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id at 2281, 2281 n 2. 
 6 AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2288. 
 7 Id at 2292–93 (Breyer dissenting). 
 8 Id at 2283. 
 9 United States v American Express Co, 88 F Supp 3d 143, 220–21, 224 (EDNY 2015). 
 10 AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2287–88. 
 11 See United States v American Express Co, 838 F3d 179, 206 (2d Cir 2016); AmEx, 
138 S Ct at 2290. 
 12 AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2280. 
 13 Id at 2281. 
 14 American Express Co, 838 F3d at 188. 
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Two-sidedness makes antitrust analysis complex (see Justice 
Breyer’s consternation above). Traditionally, when a price can be 
sustained above the cost of offering a good or service, this is indic-
ative of a market failure. However, in a two-sided market, high 
prices on one side of the market alone are not proof of anticom-
petitive harm. The relevant economic question is whether card 
networks’ total revenue—on both sides of the market—is elevated 
relative to the total cost of intermediating this transaction. The 
economics of two-sided markets push for consideration of the mar-
ket as a whole, rather than each side in isolation. 
The AmEx decision makes a version of this argument, stating 
that “[e]vidence of a price increase on one side of a two-sided 
transaction platform cannot, by itself, demonstrate an anticom-
petitive exercise of market power.”15 Many antitrust experts be-
lieve this is flawed reasoning that represents a stark departure 
from precedent,16 which historically defines markets for antitrust 
analysis narrowly by focusing on the service “directly affected by 
a challenged restraint.”17 These critiques have merit. But unless 
reversed, the AmEx decision will make it difficult to challenge the 
pricing practices of many two-sided platforms on antitrust 
grounds. This is also true for two-sided markets beyond payment 
networks: just as a card network’s restraint on merchants can be 
offset by benefits to consumers on the other side of the market, so 
too can restraints on Uber drivers be offset by low-cost rides. 
This Essay proposes a way forward for reining in two-sided 
markets. Specifically, I advocate that consumer protection au-
thority can play the role historically performed by antitrust, at 
least with respect to the payment industry. The Dodd-Frank Act18 
provides the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) with 
the authority to prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or prac-
tices (UDAAP) that cause injury that cannot be “reasonably 
avoid[ed].”19 The anti-steering clauses at the heart of the AmEx 
decision are unfair to consumers and thus can be restricted using 
the CFPB’s UDAAP authority. This is true generally for prohibi-
tions on merchants’ ability to surcharge retail customers who  
 
 15 AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2287. 
 16 See, for example, Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The 
American Express Case, 2019 Colum Bus L Rev 35, 80–81; Erik Hovenkamp, Platform 
Antitrust *8–9 (forthcoming manuscript), archived at https://perma.cc/JQ2H-A7T7. 
 17 AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2295 (Breyer dissenting). 
 18 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203, 
124 Stat 1376 (2010). 
 19 Dodd-Frank Act § 1031, 124 Stat at 2006, codified at 12 USC § 5531. 
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use rewards cards to transact that are expensive for merchants to 
process. 
Antitrust critics of the AmEx decision focus on the harm suf-
fered by consumers in credit card markets. As Professor Erik 
Hovenkamp explains: 
The Supreme Court overlooked the parties’ capacity to bal-
ance fees against rewards through bilateral contracting. In-
tuitively, when a buyer and seller are permitted to bargain 
over alternative payment platforms, their common objective 
is the same as that of all contracting parties: to maximize 
their joint-welfare and split the surplus in a way that leaves 
them both better off than the status quo.20 
This is true, and so the antisteering rules are UDAAPs from 
the perspective of the credit card consumer, who is losing out on 
the ability to bargain for a piece of this surplus. She can’t reason-
ably avoid the harm of losing some of this surplus.21 But what the 
antitrust view misses in its focus on a well-defined market is that 
the choice of a payment instrument has important consequences 
for consumers outside of the credit card market as well. Because 
of antisteering rules, merchants set uniform retail prices. To pro-
cess certain rewards cards, they pay more than 3 percent of total 
transaction value in interchange fees.22 This fee is significantly 
higher than the cost of processing debit cards (capped at $0.22 
plus 0.05 percent of the transaction amount) or cash (no transac-
tion fees).23 In low-margin businesses—for example, average gen-
eral retail profits are 2 percent24—merchants pass large inter-
change costs through to consumers. Some consumers receive a 
 
 20 Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust at *36 (cited in note 16). 
 21 For an example of this surplus, see Hovenkamp, 2019 Colum Bus Rev at 77 (cited 
in note 16) (citation omitted):  
On a typical transaction, the Amex merchant acceptance fee may be fifty percent 
greater than the fee charged by competing cards. Suppose that on a particular 
purchase Amex's merchant fee was $30, but $20 for Visa. This $10 difference 
creates bargaining room—a “surplus,” in Coasean terms—for the merchant and 
the cardholder to strike a mutually beneficial deal. 
 22 Credit Card Processing Fees and Costs (ValuePenguin), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/M2Y6-7MN3. 
 23 Vladimir Mukharlyamov and Natasha Sarin, Price Regulation in Two-Sided Mar-
kets: Empirical Evidence from Debit Cards *3 n 2 (working paper, Mar 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/ZEW6-KH9V. 
 24 Aswath Damodaran, Margins by Sector (US) (NYU, 2019), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/B964-JGPG. 
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kickback on their retail purchases in the form of credit card re-
wards. However, cash users bear high retail prices to cover the 
costs of other people transacting with credit cards. Cash users are 
disproportionately lower-income and less financially sophisti-
cated consumers.25 This means that the payments system engen-
ders regressive cross subsidization of the wealthy by the poor. 
This cross subsidization is unfair to non-rewards-card users 
and cannot be avoided by them, especially given that many who 
transact with cash or low-interchange debit cards do not have ac-
cess to credit. This means the CFPB has the authority to prohibit 
card networks’ antisteering provisions and restraints on mer-
chant surcharging more broadly. This approach is not a pana-
cea—as I discuss, many state laws restrict heterogeneous pricing. 
Further, even if merchants have the right to vary consumer price 
depending on the payment instrument used, they may choose not 
to do so for fear of alienating their customers. Preliminary survey 
evidence suggests that surcharges are unlikely to be popular in 
practice. 
However, removing merchant surcharging restraints is a val-
uable first step to address the inequities in the payments market, 
and consumer protection authority is well-suited to the challenge, 
especially given recent antitrust headwinds. While antitrust has 
historically helped eliminate barriers to competition in payments 
markets, post-AmEx the Court will require a complex balancing 
act of harms to merchants relative to benefits to consumers before 
finding a pricing practice anticompetitive. Practically, this deci-
sion makes it much more difficult to succeed in an antitrust chal-
lenge, as even demonstrating an anticompetitive restraint is not 
sufficient unless the harms outweigh benefits on the other side of 
the market. 
In addition to practical difficulties deploying antitrust going 
forward, there are conceptual challenges as well. Despite our his-
torical reliance on antitrust to rein in card networks, antitrust 
appears confused with respect to two-sided markets in a way that 
consumer protection authority does not, making the latter a more 
theoretically defensible means of taming two-sided platforms. In 
important ways, the traditional antitrust conception of the relevant 
market for scrutiny in platform pricing cases seems too narrow. 
Professor Jean Tirole, a Nobel Laureate who studies two-sided 
 
 25 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Study Finds Consumers in Lower-Income 
Areas Are More Likely to Become Credit Visible Due to Negative Records (Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau, June 7, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/L9V5-EKU4. 
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platforms, has argued that consideration of the pricing practices 
on only one side of a two-sided market is indefensible and can lead 
to distortionary regulation.26 And yet historically—until AmEx—
this narrow inquiry was the antitrust paradigm. And with its fo-
cus on precise market definition, antitrust fails to consider the 
consequences for consumers outside of the narrowly defined mar-
ket, who may well be (and in the case of payment cards, are) suf-
fering harm that feels importantly relevant to our consideration 
of how functional this market is. Consumer protection authority 
allows us to defend intervention—not by misapplying “one-sided 
logic” to “two-sided markets,” as economists caution against27—
but instead by embracing a broader definition of the market that 
appreciates that platform users create unavoidable externalities 
for all consumers, and these externalities (when sufficiently 
harmful) must be addressed. 
This Essay focuses on payments markets, although its in-
sights could potentially be applied to two-sided platforms more 
generally. Its main push is for broadening our conception of a 
market to appreciate that prices and pricing structures cannot be 
considered in isolation—either by focusing on one side of the mar-
ket alone or on consumers in a particular market alone, thereby 
neglecting the existence of externalities that may well have 
broader welfare implications. 
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I out-
lines the economics of two-sided platforms, explaining why con-
sideration of one side of a two-sided market in isolation is prob-
lematic. Part II discusses payments markets specifically and the 
dangers of applying “one-sided economics” to this two-sided mar-
ket. Part III provides background on how antitrust had success-
fully reined in card network pricing practices until the Court’s 
paradigm-shifting decision in AmEx. Part IV argues that con-
sumer protection authority can succeed where antitrust has failed 
by restricting antisteering restraints—and card network prac-
tices more generally—that lead to inequitable cross subsidization 
of the wealthy by lower-income, less financially sophisticated con-
sumers. Part V contains a caveat: although consumer protection 
authority can restrict card network practices, barriers remain. 
 
 26 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, An Economic Analysis of the Determination 
of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems, 2 Rev Network Econ 69, 76–78 (2003). 
 27 See generally Julian Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets (AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper No 03-10, Sept 2003),  
archived at https://perma.cc/FLZ8-9BWB.  
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For example, several states limit merchants’ ability to charge dif-
ferent prices to consumers who transact with more and less costly 
payment instruments, and novel survey evidence shows consum-
ers may shift away from merchants who surcharge. 
I.  NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND TWO-SIDED MARKETS 
A. Background on Two-Sided Markets 
Why can you travel to Europe on airplane miles or receive a 
cash back refund for dining out? Card issuers spend more than 
$20 billion on consumer rewards annually.28 Offering the most  
attractive rewards is how networks compete for customers, who 
choose cards primarily based on the rewards they will receive. 
The existence of rewards means consumers pay a negative per-
transaction fee for using their credit cards. 
A two-sided market involves two distinct types of users, each 
of whom derives value from interacting with the other.29 At the 
center of these markets lies an intermediary, or a platform.30 This 
intermediary must set both price levels and price structures to 
get the two sides of the market on board.31 For example, Uber 
must (1) set fares that are not too high, or consumers will not use 
their service; and (2) pay drivers wages that are not too low, or 
they will lose drivers. 
Platforms feature network externalities. The utility consum-
ers derive from the consumption of a good in a two-sided market 
increases based on the number of other agents who are in a net-
work.32 A card network intermediates between consumers, who 
use cards and get rewards, and merchants, who accept cards and 
pay processing fees. A payment card can offer excellent rewards, 
but unless it is accepted by merchants, it is worthless to consum-
ers. Similarly, a payment card can offer very low processing fees 
to merchants, but unless consumers use the card regularly, low-
cost processing is of no value. Similarly, eBay and Amazon are 
 
 28 Spending on Credit Card Rewards Has Exploded in Banks’ Frenzied Competition 
over Customers (Business Insider, May 5, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/28WX-S6YD. 
 29 Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets at *1 (cited in note 27). 
 30 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Mar-
kets, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc 990, 995 (2003). 
 31 Id at 990, 1004–06. 
 32 See Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 Am Econ Rev 424, 426 (1985). 
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only valuable to consumers if merchants sell products on the plat-
form, and video game companies must simultaneously attract de-
velopers to make games and consumers to buy them. 
The presence of network externalities makes the start-up 
phase of two-sided markets complex because the market has no 
value until both sides are on board. To overcome this “chicken-
and-egg” problem, platforms carefully choose prices and price 
structures to attract both sides.33 Platforms often choose price 
structures in which one side of the market is treated as a “loss 
leader” and the other as a “profit center.”34 This choice depends 
not just on how costly each side of the market is to service, but 
also on how competitive each side is, how sensitive demand on 
each side of the market is to price changes, and the relative sur-
plus each side generates. Taking an oft-used and unfortunately 
heteronormative example, imagine it is more expensive for an 
open bar to service women because they tend to like high-end 
cocktails instead of cheap beer. You may think women will pay 
more for the open bar; however, they may pay less or even noth-
ing, if, for example, attracting an additional woman to the club 
raises more surplus from the existing male patrons than attract-
ing an additional man does for the female patrons.35 
The choice of price structure can vary across industry. Pro-
fessors Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole write extensively 
about the theoretical underpinnings of these markets and provide 
illustrations of myriad business models.36 Social media platforms 
like Facebook are free to consumers (loss leader) while revenue is 
generated from advertising sales (profit center). Price structures 
can also change over time: historically, TV networks made money 
from ad sales and generally treated viewers as a loss leader; to-
day, several streaming platforms charge consumers usage fees 
and promise ad-free viewing. 
B. Two-Sided Markets and Antitrust 
The nature of two-sided markets can make the traditional 
logic of economics—and antitrust—hard to apply, with important 
policy implications. In a traditional market, a price that can be 
sustained at a level higher than the cost of providing a product is 
 
 33 Rochet and Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc at 990–91 (cited in note 30). 
 34 Id at 990–91. 
 35 See Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets at *4 (cited in note 27). 
 36 See, for example, Rochet and Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc at 1012–17 (cited in note 30). 
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indicative of a market failure. To see why, imagine that it costs 
$0.50 to produce a jar of tomato sauce, and that the tomato sauce 
stand (Tomato 1) is selling its sauce for $1.00. Another company 
(Tomato 2) would have every incentive to set up and sell its to-
mato sauce for $0.99—and in so doing, would capture the entire 
market. The extra rents would be competed away until tomato 
sauce sells for exactly its $0.50 marginal cost, although perhaps 
not immediately—in the short run, Tomato 1 might sustain high 
prices while Tomato 2 enters the market and sets up production. 
But in the long run, prices staying at $1.00, or rising, would indi-
cate a market failure. For example, prices may remain above cost 
because Tomato 1 and Tomato 2 collude to generate excess prof-
its. As this simple example illustrates, the existence of an above-
cost price serves as a flag to antitrust authorities that this market 
merits scrutiny. 
This logic does not carry over to two-sided markets. An effi-
cient price structure does not reflect only relative costs, but also 
the surplus that each side of the market derives from the other.37 
The existence of a high price-cost margin on one side of the mar-
ket is not dispositive on market failure, nor is the existence of 
below-cost pricing dispositive on anticompetitive predation.38 
Card networks may charge consumers a negative price for card 
usage and merchants an above-cost processing fee to exploit mer-
chants’ inability to negotiate lower-cost terms and extract monop-
oly rents.39 Or, this price structure could be fair or efficient for a 
perfectly competitive market.40 
Thus, the inquiry for an antitrust authority should be 
whether the total revenue generated—on both sides of the mar-
ket—is higher than the total cost of providing a service. Pricing 
dynamics on one side of the market cannot alone reveal if markets 
are imperfect.41 
 
 37 Id at 997–98. 
 38 Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets at *3–4 (cited in note 27). 
 39 See Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust at *23–24 (cited in note 16). 
 40 See id at *21–27 (providing an overview of the unique antitrust considerations 
posed by platform economics). 
 41 David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 
Yale J Reg 325, 359–61 (2003). 
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II.  CANONICAL TWO-SIDED MARKET: PAYMENTS 
A. How Does Pricing Work? 
Every time you use your credit or debit card to make a retail 
purchase, a complex series of transactions begins among a host of 
market participants. Imagine a consumer uses a Chase Sapphire 
Reserve (a Visa credit card issued by JPMorgan Chase) to buy 
groceries from Mom and Pop Grocery Co, which banks with Bank 
of America. The groceries cost $40. This money must find its way 
from the JPMorgan Chase customer to the Bank of America mer-
chant’s account. 
The merchant pays its bank (Bank of America) for processing 
these transactions (with an ironically named “merchant discount” 
fee). Bank of America keeps a portion of this fee and pays the card 
network and the customer’s bank (JPMorgan Chase), which also 
pays the card network for intermediation. 
At the end of this complex series of transactions, we are left 
with the following: 
 
Example Credit Transaction 
Cost of groceries $40.00 
Consumer pays $39.60 
Merchant receives $38.60 
Acquiring bank receives (net) $0.15 
Issuing bank receives (net) $0.75 
Network receives $0.10 
 
In this example, the merchant pays 3.5 percent of the value 
of the transaction ($1.40) in myriad network and bank fees (inter-
change fees).42 Consumers get 1 percentage point of this 3.5 per-
cent in the form of rewards ($0.40). The remaining 2.5 percentage 
points ($1.00) are split between the card network, the issuing 
bank, and the acquiring bank. In the United States, this same 
chain operates even if the issuing bank and the acquiring bank are 
the same, as card networks tend to require that cards be routed 
through their network rather than through the bank directly. 
Interchange fees have historically varied depending on the 
payment instrument. Credit interchange fees tend to be higher 
 
 42 Rochet and Tirole, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc at 1005 (cited in note 30). 
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than debit interchange fees,43 which are subdivided into “signa-
ture debit” transactions and “PIN debit” transactions.44 Until the 
early 2000s, the highest interchange fees were around 1.5 percent 
for Visa and Mastercard credit cards.45 Then, in the years preced-
ing the Great Recession, card issuers began introducing rewards 
cards like “Visa Signature Preferred” and “MC World High 
Value.”46 They set higher interchange fees (around 2.5 percent)47 
on these cards and encouraged their use through attractive re-
wards programs. AmEx has emerged as a competitor, and its 
business model involves charging the highest interchange rates—
often on the order of 3.5 percent48—and inducing card usage 
through extremely attractive rewards programs for its wealthy 
clientele. Discover traditionally had a very different business 
model: trying to compete by offering low interchange fees to  
merchants.49 
B. Attempts at Cost-Based Regulation 
The “balancing act” networks perform to get both sides on 
board results in prices that have “little relationship with account-
ants’ notions of cost allocation.”50 As explained above, this means 
that above- and below-cost pricing on one side of the market may 
not be a market power distortion, but rather, optimal to ensuring 
platforms to encourage participation on each side of the market 
and create large network externalities. 
From a policy perspective, the fact that price structures can 
produce below-price costs on one side of a two-sided market 
makes cost-based regulation undesirable. However, cost-based 
regulation is common in these markets. In the early 2000s, Aus-
tralian authorities proposed and eventually adopted a cap on 
 
 43 Mukharlyamov and Sarin, Price Regulation in Two-Sided Markets at *3 n 2 (cited 
in note 23). 
 44 Ben Dwyer, Debit Card Transaction Fees (CardFellow, June 17, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/46VE-MFAP. 
 45 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Payments System Research, Credit and 
Debit Card Interchange Fees Assessed to Merchants in the United States August 2017 Up-
date V-1–V-3 (Aug 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/BRF4-KF2W. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Credit Card Processing Fees and Costs (cited in note 22). 
 49 Id. The distinction between different platforms’ business models is at the core of 
the recent monumental Supreme Court decision in Ohio v American Express discussed 
above. See AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2282–83. 
 50 Rochet and Tirole, 2 Rev Network Econ at 70 (cited in note 26). 
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credit card interchange rates because these “fees [were] signifi-
cantly above levels suggested by cost-based methodologies.”51 
In response to Australia’s proposal, economists argued stren-
uously that this was the wrong way to think about prices in two-
sided markets. Professors Rochet and Tirole warned that high 
merchant prices alone were not sufficient to justify likely distor-
tionary regulation.52 Instead, they asserted: 
Proponents of a regulation of the [interchange fee] must first 
build a theoretical paradigm that gathers broad intellectual 
consensus and demonstrates a clear market failure, show 
that the resulting distortions have a clear sign and a sizeable 
impact on welfare, and propose a form of regulation that . . . 
is better tha[n] non-intervention. . . . Misunderstanding the 
economics of the problem and imposing cost-based regulation 
could impose substantial distortions in the industry.53 
In his article, One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets, Profes-
sor Julian Wright made a similar admonition that efficient prices 
in two-sided markets can be “very different from [ ] normal mar-
ginal cost pricing. . . . Otherwise, shopping malls would charge 
consumers for entry . . . [and] academics would pay hefty fees 
when submitting their articles to journals.”54 
The limited evidence suggests that, as Professors Rochet, 
Tirole, and Wright predicted, the Australian intervention did 
not deliver consumer savings and had unintended conse-
quences.55 The objective was to raise the cost of transacting with 
credit cards, thereby reducing the use of a less efficient and more 
pernicious payment instrument.56 Regulators also hoped for an 
 
 51 Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Competition and Consumer Commis-
sion, Debit and Credit Card Schemes in Australia: A Study of Interchange Fees and Access 
*73 (Oct 2000), archived at https://perma.cc/59YX-S5KD. 
 52 Rochet and Tirole, 2 Rev Network Econ at 76–78 (cited in note 26). 
 53 Id at 71. 
 54 Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets at *23 (cited in note 27). In many 
cases, it feels like we do. 
 55 Howard Chang, David S. Evans, and Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz, The Effect of Reg-
ulatory Intervention in Two-Sided Markets: An Assessment of Interchange-Fee Capping in 
Australia, 4 Rev Network Econ 328, 349 (2005). But see Joseph Farrell, Assessing Austral-
ian Interchange Regulation: Comments on Chang, Evans and Garcia-Swartz, 4 Rev Net-
work Econ 359, 361, 363 (2005) (arguing that the Chang, Evans, and Garcia-Swartz paper 
focuses on noisy data and the correct interpretation is “that so far the data don’t show 
much” as to the effects of the Royal Bank of Australia’s intervention). 
 56 Chang, Evans, and Garcia-Swartz, 4 Rev Network Econ at 350 (cited in note 55). 
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across-the-board reduction in consumer costs from lower mer-
chant processing fees.57 While Australian authorities pointed to a 
decrease in credit rewards—and consequently credit usage—in 
response to the regulation, many argue that the main effect of 
reform was to transfer profits to merchants, with the costs borne 
primarily by banks and consumers.58 
Despite this heed, the United States recently followed suit in 
regulating merchant processing fees. Confusingly, the US regula-
tion targeted debit, rather than credit, interchange.59 The goal of 
the intervention (the “Durbin Amendment” or “Durbin”) was to 
bring merchant debit interchange fees closer to the level of the 
cost of providing the processing service: the final legislation re-
quired that the Federal Reserve come up with rules to ensure that 
“the amount of any interchange transaction fee . . . is reasonable 
and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to 
the transaction.”60 As in Australia, where regulation decreased 
consumer rewards,61 banks abandoned debit rewards to offset 
losses from regulation.62 To encourage consumers to use credit 
cards—left unregulated by Durbin—banks increased credit re-
wards, resulting in overuse of credit cards that creates expensive 
cycles of indebtedness.63 Banks also increased account fees, mean-
ing this consumer-oriented price regulation costs consumers at 
least $3 billion annually.64 
So both the theoretical literature and the experience of actual 
regulation caution that cost-based regulation in two-sided mar-
kets can be distortionary because high costs on one side of the 
market do not prove market failure. However, this does not mean 
there is no case for regulation of two-sided platforms. Above-cost 
 
 57 See id at 331–32. 
 58 Id at 339–40. 
 59 One result of the intervention was that banks pushed consumers toward greater 
credit usage, since these fees are left unregulated. This is an unintended and undesirable 
consequence of US interchange regulation as credit is generally thought of as a more dan-
gerous payment instrument than debit, which decouples financial transacting and con-
sumer borrowing. 
 60 Dodd-Frank Act § 1075, 124 Stat at 2068, codified at 15 USC § 1693o-2. 
 61 Keith Bradsher, US Looks to Australia on Credit Card Fees (NY Times, Nov 24, 
2009), archived at https://perma.cc/5UYN-FRUJ. 
 62 Richard Kerr, Where Have All the Rewards Debit Cards Gone? (The Points Guy, 
June 24, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/5D2X-27R4. 
 63 Mukharlyamov and Sarin, Price Regulation in Two-Sided Markets at *34–36 (cited 
in note 23). 
 64 Id at *53. 
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prices may well be suggestive—though not dispositive—of the ex-
istence of supracompetitive rents. Two-sided markets also feature 
unique issues for theory and regulation that are not implicated in 
traditional markets: consumers do not internalize the welfare im-
pact of their platform use on others, at least directly. 
III.  ANTITRUST AND THE PAYMENT INDUSTRY 
The pricing structure of card networks involves treating con-
sumers as loss leaders, charging essentially negative transaction 
prices by providing rewards to consumers for paying with cards, 
and generating revenue from merchants. These fees are a rising 
cost for merchants for two main reasons. First, card usage has 
grown: cards were used in less than 15 percent of transactions in 
199565 and around 50 percent today.66 Second, card networks re-
alized they could generate more revenue by offering rewards 
cards with even higher interchange fees than basic cards. Conse-
quently, processing fees are a significant cost for merchants, often 
their highest cost of operating after labor. 
Merchants, frustrated by this large and growing expense, ar-
gue that card networks engage in collusive pricing practices to 
extract supracompetitive rents. They contend that card networks 
set up barriers to entry for lower-cost competitors, meaning a few 
entrenched networks exploit significant market power. They also 
argue that because they have very little bargaining power in their 
relationship with card networks, their only choice is to reject 
cards altogether. Because customers have come to expect card ac-
ceptance, merchants suggest that even this choice is illusory be-
cause they must accept the terms offered or risk losing business. 
In this Part, I first provide empirical evidence to support mer-
chants’ contentions, illustrating that the payments industry is 
highly concentrated and that at least small merchants are disad-
vantaged in the bargaining relationship. I then provide a brief 
history of antitrust litigation in this setting, showing how the 
Court’s view of card networks shifts over time as payment cards 
 
 65 See Geoffrey R. Gerdes and Jack K. Walton II, The Use of Checks and Other Non-
cash Payment Instruments in the United States *361 (Federal Reserve Bulletin, Aug 2002), 
archived at https://perma.cc/AE2D-5Y8Z. 
 66 See Raynil Kumar, Tayeba Maktabi, and Shaun O’Brien, 2018 Findings from the 
Diary of Consumer Payment Choice *5 (Federal Reserve System Cash Product Office, Nov 
1, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/9CTL-V24W. 
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become more ubiquitous. Finally, I provide background on the con-
tentious AmEx decision, detailing the Court’s confusion about the 
best way to assess whether a two-sided platform is anticompetitive. 
A. Evidence Supporting Merchant Claims 
1. Card networks and issuers operate in highly 
concentrated markets. 
Visa and Mastercard control essentially 100 percent of the 
debit market share and Visa, Mastercard, and AmEx control 
96 percent of the credit card market by volume.67 Card-issuing 
banks are also concentrated, although less so. The share of do-
mestic deposits housed at the five largest banks in the United 
States has risen from less than 10 percent in 1990 to nearly 
50 percent as of 2014.68 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the market share of large card net-
works and card issuers using survey data collected from US con-
sumers using Amazon’s MTurk. While the survey population is of 
course not identical to the broader US population,69 the trends are 
informative and reveal the significant concentration of the bank 
and card network markets. 
Of those surveyed, 66 percent of consumers reported having 
a Visa credit card, and 49 percent a Mastercard.70 Only 10 percent 
of survey responders reported not having a credit card from one 
of the large four issuers (Visa, Mastercard, Discover, and AmEx), 
with Discover and AmEx lagging far behind the original networks 
in market share. These results show the card-issuing industry to 
be similarly concentrated: more than 50 percent of bank custom-
ers report having an account at one of the four largest depository 
institutions (Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, 
and Citibank). 
 
 67 Alina Comoreanu, Market Share by Credit Card Network (WalletHub, Sept 2, 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/K2TF-746W. 
 68 Steve Schaefer, Five Biggest US Banks Control Nearly Half Industry’s $15 Trillion 
in Assets (Forbes, Dec 3, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/X26W-VM85. 
 69 In particular, the survey is somewhat underrepresentative of the unbanked popu-
lation. Only 3 percent of the MTurk sample reports being unbanked; the Federal Reserve 
reports this number is closer to 5 percent. Federal Reserve Board, Report on the Economic 
Well-Being of US Households in 2017 (May 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/T25G 
-8U2K. Similarly, only 10 percent of the MTurk population reports not having a credit 
card. The Federal Reserve reports this number is 17 percent. Id. 
 70 Consumers often have more than one card. 
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FIGURE 1: CONSUMER BANKING RELATIONSHIPS71 
FIGURE 2: CONSUMER CREDIT CARD HOLDINGS72 
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2. Suggestive evidence that small merchants lack 
bargaining power. 
My previous work with Professor Vladimir Mukharlyamov 
hints at the asymmetric bargaining power in this two-sided mar-
ket.73 We focus on Durbin, which set a cap for debit interchange 
fees at $0.22 plus five basis points times the transaction value.74 
Using proprietary effective interchange data made available by a 
leading industry payments player, we study how banks and mer-
chants adjust to regulation.75 
Figure 3 illustrates interchange rates for unregulated issuers 
(not subject to Durbin) and regulated issuers (subject to Durbin).76 
Regulated issuers (red) set the maximum debit interchange fee 
permitted of $0.22. Where merchants fall on the red curve de-
pends on their average ticket size: For a $100 average transac-
tion, $0.22 is a 0.22 percent interchange fee; for a $10 transaction, 
it is a 2.2 percent interchange fee. 
The blue curve shows the extreme dispersion in pricing for 
unregulated issuers. So, for the same average transaction size, 
different merchants pay different rates. For a $25 transaction in 
Industry A, interchange expense ranges from $0.10 to $0.75. 
What explains this difference? 
 
 71 Note: Author’s calculations. Survey results from Mechanical Turk survey of nearly 
1,300 consumers in the United States (data on file with author). 
 72 Note: Author’s calculations. Survey results from Mechanical Turk survey of nearly 
1,300 consumers in the United States (data on file with author). 
 73 See Mukharlyamov and Sarin, Price Regulation in Two-Sided Markets at *14–17 
(cited in note 23). 
 74 Id at *11. 
 75 Id at *14–15. 
 76 See id at *72. 
570 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:553 
 
FIGURE 3: INTERCHANGE RATES FOR UNREGULATED AND 
REGULATED ISSUERS77 
 
Large merchants with market power are in a superior bar-
gaining position with card networks. Card networks are explicit 
about this: Visa and Mastercard publish bulletins of interchange 
rates with tiers or thresholds listed describing how large retailers 
with significant transaction volume bear lower interchange 
costs.78 For example, a small, standalone grocer pays an inter-
change rate of 1.65 percent on traditional Visa credit card trans-
actions, whereas a large grocery chain with $5.82 billion or more 
in annual volume pays only 1.15 percent per transaction. 79 These 
are significant savings—on the order of tens of millions of dollars 
annually for the large grocer. 
The published tiered pricing schedules lack the granularity 
to illustrate the dispersion shown in Figure 3. Large retailers 
 
 77 Adapted from Natasha Sarin and Vladimir Mukharlyamov, The Impact of the Dur-
bin Amendment on Banks, Merchants, and Consumers, (working paper, Jan 2019), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/YFP8-L3J2. 
 78 See, for example, Visa USA Interchange Reimbursement Fees: Visa Supplemental 
Requirements *7, 9 (Visa Public, Apr 13, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/M36Q-TA9T. 
 79 Id. 
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negotiate much more attractive pricing terms than non-chain re-
tailers because the potential loss of merchant acceptance is a sig-
nificant threat to the network. Costco’s history with interchange 
illustrates this point anecdotally.80 Prior to 2016, Costco accepted 
only AmEx cards, and transitioned in 2016 to accepting only Visa 
and debit cards.81 This was a market-moving event: AmEx’s stock 
fell by 6.4 percent the day Costco announced the separation; Visa’s 
stock increased by 14 percent after the announcement.82 Prior to 
this shift, AmEx had offered Costco an interchange rate of around 
0.6 percent, well below its 3 percent average across retailers; fol-
lowing the shift, its interchange rate from Visa is near zero.83 
Smaller merchants argue that the lower interchange rates 
that their larger counterparts negotiate reflect how disadvan-
taged they are in bargaining with card networks. When networks 
and merchants are on more equal footing, the interchange rates 
that prevail in markets are much lower than those faced by small 
non-chain retailers. The lack of bargaining power impedes small 
retailers’ ability to offer low prices and attract market share, thus 
lessening competition in the retail market as well. 
B. Antitrust Challenges  
1. History of antitrust.  
The existence of highly concentrated card networks and 
asymmetries in the card network/merchant bargaining relation-
ship prompted significant antitrust scrutiny in the payments 
arena. Initially, card networks were able to successfully defend 
scrutinized practices as necessary to build up both sides of these 
markets.84 In reaching these early decisions, courts were clear 
that the infancy of the market influenced their embrace of net-
work practices, noting that “[l]ike any major economic transition, 
 
 80 See Abigail Stevenson, Cramer: Real Winner of the Costco Credit Card Shake-Up 
(Hint: Not Visa) (CNBC, June 20, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/QZ3J-RZSU. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Elizabeth Dexheimer and Matt Townsend, Costco to Pay Almost Zero to Accept 
Credit Cards (Bloomberg, Apr 17, 2015), online at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-04-17/costco-seen-paying-almost-zero-to-accept-cards-in-citigroup-deal (vis-
ited Jan 31, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 84 See, for example, National Bancard Corp v Visa USA Inc, 596 F Supp 1231, 1240, 
1265 (SD Fla 1984) (finding that Visa’s offering discounts for “on-us” transactions—in 
which the card issuing and acquiring bank were the same—may impede competitors like 
National Bancard Corp who only service one side of the market, but are procompetitive 
overall). 
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the movement from cash to cashless payment systems is not with-
out growing pains.”85 
The relatively recent explosion of card usage and the growing 
profitability of card networks makes practices once viewed as key 
to creating network externalities today appear as impediments to 
competition. Historically, Visa and Mastercard restricted their 
member banks from issuing cards from competitor networks. Net-
works contended that allowing members to issue competitor cards 
would be “tantamount to forcing Burger King to sell Big Macs.”86 
This argument was ultimately unpersuasive, with the courts 
eventually determining that exclusivity restrained competition 
from new competitors like Discover and AmEx, with these anti-
competitive effects outweighing any procompetitive value.87 
Merchants also successfully challenged card networks. They 
argued against “honor all cards” rules—which required mer-
chants who wanted to accept any Visa and Mastercard payment 
instruments to accept all of them.88 Thus, merchants could not 
accept only debit cards (with lower processing fees) from these 
networks. Networks eventually agreed to decouple debit and credit 
acceptance, although this was not a full victory: merchants who 
accept some credit cards from a network must accept all of them.89 
A third class of antitrust cases involves card networks’ anti-
surcharge rules. Card networks are incentivized to ensure their 
cards will be used by customers and accepted by merchants. This 
means they are opposed to differential pricing for different pay-
ment instruments, which could encourage consumers to use a 
payment form that will not be surcharged or pay with another 
form and get a discount. Merchant contracts historically featured 
explicit prohibitions on differential pricing: 
 
 85 Id at 1236. 
 86 Max B. Knudson, Appeals Court Reverses Jury’s Decision on Visa USA (Deseret 
News, Sept 24, 1994), archived at https://perma.cc/V4SU-XJJQ. 
 87 United States v Visa USA Inc, 163 F Supp 2d 322, 399 (SDNY 2001), affd 344 F3d 
229 (2d Cir 2003). 
 88 Dennis Green, Stores and Credit-Card Companies Are in an All-Out War over Fees 
(Business Insider, Sept 27, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2ACG-78U7. 
 89 Large merchants opted out of a recent settlement with Visa and Mastercard 
largely to challenge this practice. See id. 
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You [the seller] agree that the prices (including any service 
or other charges) charged to our Cardmembers including ad-
vertised sales will not be greater than those charged to other 
customers.90 
For more than three decades, merchants have been challeng-
ing these clauses as illegal restraints on trade. Card networks 
made concessions, first agreeing that merchants can offer cash 
discounts.91 And recently, Visa and Mastercard settled with mer-
chants to allow surcharging of up to 4 percent on credit transac-
tions.92 Merchants are now allowed to add a surcharge at the 
“brand level” to all Visa/Mastercard products, or to particular 
types of credit card transactions at the “product level” (for exam-
ple, traditional versus rewards cards).93 Surcharges can differ de-
pending on the product line and are capped at the actual pro-
cessing fee merchants pay on a payment instrument.94 However, 
merchants that accepted AmEx cards (AmEx did not settle in this 
case, but eventually brought it to the Supreme Court) remained 
practically barred from surcharging because those merchants 
could only surcharge Visa and Mastercard if they surcharged all 
cards with “equal or higher”95 processing costs. Since AmEx 
charges the highest interchange fees, this means that a merchant 
who accepts cards from all three networks was unable to sur-
charge consumers; even after Visa and Mastercard allowed sur-
charging in theory, though not in practice.96 
 
 90 Edmund W. Kitch, The Framing Hypothesis: Is It Supported by Credit Card Issuer 
Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price?, 6 J Law Econ & Org 217, 219 n 4 (1990) 
(alteration in original). 
 91 This proved complicated in practice because the Truth in Lending Act at the time 
required that any difference between a cash and credit price be converted to an “annual 
percentage rate” to be easily understood. Id at 221. A 5 percent surcharge would then be 
a 60 percent rate, which could trigger state usury statutes. Id. Congress then amended 
the Truth in Lending Act to permit discounts for those who do not transact with credit 
cards. It also deemed these charges would not constitute a finance charges and thus be 
subject to the APR disclosure. Id at 226. 
 92 Melissa Johnson, Your Complete Guide to Credit Card Surcharges (Merchant Mav-
erick, Feb 2, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/DE9V-AKSN. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Phil Hinke, U.S. Merchants Can Now Charge for Credit Card Transactions (Prac-
tical Ecommerce, Jan 31, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/SDJ8-SS9K.  
 96 Robb Mandelbaum, Visa and MasterCard Settle Lawsuit, but Merchants Aren’t 
Celebrating (NY Times, Aug 8, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/7VB4-GH5K. 
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2. Ohio v American Express. 
Ohio v American Express is seen by many antitrust experts 
as the most significant antitrust case in a decade.97 The case con-
siders whether antisteering provisions are anticompetitive.98 
These provisions ban merchants from surcharging AmEx users to 
recover the expense associated with processing these transactions 
and even bar merchants from expressing a preference that con-
sumers use cards with lower processing fees.99 
a) Factual determination of lower court.  A key issue that 
AmEx addressed, likely unsatisfactorily, is how to think about the 
relevant market in determining the existence of anticompetitive 
harm. At issue in the case was whether restrictions that caused 
harm on one side of the market (antisteering provisions that re-
stricted merchants’ ability to steer consumers toward cheaper 
forms of payment) could be offset by benefits on the other side of 
the market (attractive rewards that consumers receive for trans-
acting with AmEx cards).100 In essence: is this one market, or two? 
The district court said two: 
[T]he court agrees with Plaintiffs that this two-sided plat-
form comprises at least two separate, yet deeply interrelated, 
markets: a market for card issuance, in which Amex and 
Discover compete with thousands of Visa- and MasterCard-
issuing banks; and a network services market, in which Visa, 
Mastercard, Amex, and Discover compete to sell acceptance 
services.101 
The legal standard governing the case was a rule-of-reason 
analysis requiring a three-step inquiry:102 (1) plaintiffs bear the 
 
 97 See, for example, Lina Khan, The Supreme Court Just Quietly Gutted Antitrust 
Law (Vox, July 3, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4KZ2-JWQX. 
 98 As described above, Visa and Mastercard were initially part of this antitrust liti-
gation as well but chose to settle. 
 99 Specifically, under AmEx’s standard antisteering provisions, a merchant that de-
cides to accept AmEx cards may not “indicate or imply that they prefer” a non-AmEx form 
of payment; “try to dissuade” a customer from using an AmEx card; “try to persuade or 
prompt . . . any other method of payment”; “impose any restrictions, conditions, disad-
vantages, or fees” on AmEx cards “that are not imposed equally on” other payment prod-
ucts, “except for electronic funds transfer, or cash and check.” American Express Merchant 
Reference Guide—U.S. *14 (American Express, April 2019), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/J6WE-Q6WS.  
 100 See AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2286. 
 101 United States v American Express Co, 88 F Supp 3d 143, 151 (EDNY 2015). 
 102 Id at 168. 
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burden of showing restraints have an “adverse effect on competi-
tion as a whole in the relevant market,”103 either by “show[ing] an 
actual adverse effect on competition” or by “establishing that [the 
defendant] had sufficient market power to cause an adverse effect 
on competition”;104 (2) if plaintiffs can discharge the initial bur-
den, it shifts to the defendants to offer evidence of procompetitive 
effects; and (3) if the defendants demonstrate procompetitive ef-
fects, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to show that any “le-
gitimate competitive benefits”105 could have been achieved 
through “less restrictive” means.106 
The lower court determined that plaintiffs met the burden of 
proof with respect to the market for “credit and charge card net-
work services” (the merchant side of the market) both directly 
(showing an adverse effect on competition) and indirectly (show-
ing significant market power).107 As a precise illustration of the 
anticompetitive harm, the court pointed out that AmEx antisteer-
ing provisions block low-cost alternative business models, like 
that of Discover, which set low prices to compete for merchant 
business but failed to gain market share since customers could 
not be steered to their cards.108 Consequently, Discover moved 
from a “Low Cost Provider Strategy” to a “Close Competitive Gap” 
strategy, increasing merchant fees and consumer rewards to more 
closely resemble the business model of the other networks.109 The 
lower court concluded that 
the failure of Discover’s low-price value proposition is em-
blematic of the harm done to the competitive process by 
Amex’s rules against merchant steering. . . . [A] supplier in 
the network services market cannot realistically expect to re-
ceive any competitive benefit for offering a price below that 
 
 103 Id, quoting Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp v Barr Laboratories Inc, 386 
F3d 485, 506–07 (2d Cir 2004). 
 104 American Express Co, 88 F Supp 3d at 169, quoting Tops Markets, Inc v Quality 
Markets, Inc, 142 F3d 90, 96 (2d Cir 1998) (alteration in original). 
 105 American Express Co, 88 F Supp 3d at 169, quoting Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 386 
F3d at 507. 
 106 American Express Co, 88 F Supp 3d at 169.  
 107 Id at 207. Proof of market power comes both from overall transaction volume 
(AmEx accounts for more than 25 percent of the credit card market) and from the ability 
of AmEx to raise interchange fees repeatedly while gaining market share. Id at 190, 195. 
 108 Id at 213–14. 
 109 Id at 214–15. 
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of its competitors, even if such a move would benefit mer-
chants and their customers alike.110 
b) Confused market definition.  On appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit overturned the lower court’s decision, finding that it “erred 
in excluding the market for cardholders from its relevant market 
definition.”111 The argument was that merchant pricing was only 
“one half of the pertinent equation,” and that the determination 
of harm in this market required weighing the harm to merchants 
against the benefits that accrued to cardholders on the other side 
of the credit card transaction at issue.112 Thus, the appellate court 
ruled that the plaintiffs had not carried their burden to prove an-
ticompetitive effects in the relevant market, determining that 
“[t]his evidence of increased output is not only indicative of a 
thriving market for credit-card services but is also consistent with 
evidence that Amex’s . . . model, supported by its [nondiscrimina-
tory provisions], has increased rather than decreased competition 
overall within the credit-card industry.”113 
Many legal academics found the Second Circuit’s reasoning 
deeply problematic.114 Traditionally, direct proof on anticompeti-
tive harm—as offered by the District Court—shows that “what-
ever the relevant market might be, American Express had enough 
power in that market to cause that harm.”115 As Justice Breyer’s 
dissent in the Supreme Court case suggests and critics in the 
academy argue—this means that, whether the market was two-
sided or one-sided, properly or improperly defined by the lower 
courts, the factual finding of anticompetitive harm was sufficient 
to sustain the antitrust challenge. 
The Supreme Court oral arguments in AmEx reveal signifi-
cant consternation about what should and should not be properly 
included in the market definition for a two-sided market. Justice 
Elena Kagan asked, “[W]hy doesn’t [the cardholder side of the 
market] enter into the question of how you define the market in 
the first place?”116 Justice Anthony Kennedy voiced concern that 
it would be a “dangerous step for this Court to take to analyze . . . 
 
 110 American Express Co, 88 F Supp 3d at 214. 
 111 United States v American Express Co, 838 F3d 179, 197 (2d Cir 2016). 
 112 Id at 202. 
 113 Id at 206. 
 114 See, for example, Hovenkamp, 2019 Colum Bus L Rev at 58–60, 67–70 (cited in 
note 16); Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust at *31–32, 35 (cited in note 16). 
 115 AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2297 (Breyer dissenting). 
 116 AmEx Transcript at *20 (cited in note 1). 
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this two-sided market, to say that we’re going to . . . look at just 
one side.”117 Justice Breyer complained that the “jargon” of two-
sided markets was needlessly confusing and found it strange to 
think about consumer benefit in the antitrust setting.118 Consum-
ers benefit from an agreement to set high toy prices that enable 
taking care to avoid selling “poisoned toys”—but this is still an 
antitrust violation.119 
The dissent makes clarifying arguments that fit with the 
views of many in the academy. The first is that “a discussion of 
market definition was legally unnecessary at step 1” of the rule of 
reason inquiry.120 The second is that, even if the Court had chosen 
to define a market, it should have followed the precedent for two-
sided markets set by Times-Picayune Publishing Co v United 
States121 that courts should begin “definition of a relevant market 
by focusing narrowly on the good or service directly affected by a 
challenged restraint.”122 The Court explained that 
every newspaper is a dual trader in separate though interde-
pendent markets; it sells the paper’s news and advertising 
content to its readers; in effect that readership is in turn sold 
to the buyers of advertising space. . . . This case concerns 
solely one of those markets. . . . For this reason, dominance in 
the advertising market, not in readership, must be decisive.123 
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp explains the rationale for one-
sided analysis in two-sided markets as follows: although when de-
fining markets it makes sense to consider the existence of substi-
tute products, which restrain a firm’s ability to charge higher 
prices, the same is not true in the credit card market.124 The two 
sides of the platform involve complementary products—card us-
age and merchant acceptance are not interchangeable but instead 
go hand-in-hand. Thus, one side of this market cannot discipline 
the other. 
Some competition scholars go beyond disagreement with 
market definition in this case and argue broadly for abandonment 
 
 117 Id at *21. 
 118 Id at *22–23. 
 119 Id at *23. 
 120 AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2296 (Breyer dissenting). 
 121 345 US 594 (1953). 
 122 AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2295 (Breyer dissenting). 
 123 Id, quoting Times-Picayune, 345 US at 610. 
 124 See Hovenkamp, 2019 Colum Bus L Rev at 57–64 (cited in note 16). 
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of this kind of market evaluation altogether. In a seminal article, 
Why (Ever) Define Markets?, Professor Louis Kaplow argues that 
the market definition process should be abandoned. The cen-
tral, conceptual argument is that there does not exist any co-
herent way to choose a relevant market without first formu-
lating one’s best assessment of market power, whereas the 
entire rationale for the market definition process is to enable 
an inference about market power.125 
This suspicion of the usefulness of market inquiry fits with Jus-
tice Breyer’s view in AmEx, stated more colorfully: “I thought that 
if . . . three people agree upon their prices . . . I would have 
thought you just said that’s anticompetitive. That’s anticompeti-
tive. There’s no need to look at this gizmo called market power, 
which is a nightmare.”126 
IV.  A SOLUTION: CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AS 
AUTHORITY 
A. Broadening the Conception of Consumer Harm 
Despite legitimate critiques, the AmEx decision is law and 
has implications at the very least for all platforms that facilitate 
“single, simultaneous transaction[s].”127 Future antitrust litiga-
tion will have to consider both sides of the market in determining 
whether a platform’s pricing is anticompetitive. 
It is worth remembering that consideration of both sides of 
the market—although disfavored by some antitrust scholars—fits 
with economists’ view of platforms. As discussed above, what dis-
tinguishes two-sided markets from one-sided markets is that the 
intermediary chooses not only a price but also a price structure. 
Thus, two-sided platforms often use one side of the market as a 
loss leader and the other as a profit center. The mere observation 
that price levels are high and rising on one side of the market does 
not indicate a failure of competition. An increase in price on one 
side of the market could be to collect monopoly rents (as the plain-
tiffs in AmEx suggest) or it could be in response to changes in 
elasticities on the consumer side of the market that require AmEx 
to give even more generous rewards to maintain its customer 
 
 125 Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 Harv L Rev 437, 440 (2010). 
 126 AmEx Transcript at *55 (cited in note 1). 
 127 AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2286. 
2020] What’s in Your Wallet? 579 
 
base. Therefore, it is difficult in this context to think of price in-
creases as direct proof of harm as plaintiffs and the District Court 
assert.128 
Regardless of the merits, it is clear that as long as the AmEx 
precedent governs, it will be more challenging for two-sided plat-
forms to use antitrust to rein in card networks. In the first stage 
of the rule-of-reason inquiry, a plaintiff alleging a vertical re-
straint will have to show that the harm on one side of the market 
(for networks like Discover that cannot compete because of an-
tisteering provisions) is not outweighed by benefit on the comple-
mentary side of the market (that is, AmEx customers get attrac-
tive rewards). To take a series of relevant examples: it will be 
hard to bring an antitrust case against ride-sharing platforms for 
under-paying drivers without showing that this harm is not offset 
by consumer benefit, and Amazon “can continue to squeeze the 
suppliers and retailers reliant on its platform with little worry 
about being charged with the abuse of monopsony power.”129 
Beyond the legal difficulties with using antitrust to rein in 
two-sided platforms going forward, there are conceptual issues 
as well. It is not clear that competition policy is the right tool to 
address concerns about platform pricing. There are myriad issues 
with merchants not being able to steer/surcharge consumers for 
using more expensive forms of payment. One issue, which the AmEx 
discussion focuses on, is that these restraints can impede compe-
tition and restrict credit consumers from bargaining with mer-
chants for surplus if costs are lower when steering is permitted. 
That is true, but it misses another kind of consumer harm—
to a consumer who is not in this credit card market at all. Imagine 
two consumers buy $100 worth of groceries. One pays with a debit 
card (with low processing fees) and one with an AmEx. The ina-
bility to steer or surcharge the AmEx consumer leads to uniform 
pricing in this retail market—despite the fact that merchants pay 
only $0.22 to process the debit transaction and $2.00 to process 
the credit card transaction. In a perfectly competitive market 
 
 128 The Court concluded that anticompetitive effects can be shown either directly by 
“proof of actual detrimental effects [on competition],” id at 2284, quoting Federal Trade 
Commission v Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US 447, 460 (1986) (alteration in origi-
nal), which could include “reduced output, increased prices, or decreased quality in the 
relevant market,” or indirectly, by proving “market power plus some evidence that the 
challenged restraint harms competition.” AmEx, 138 S Ct at 2284. That said, the antisteer-
ing rules clearly restrain competition, as detailed at length by Hovenkamp. See 
Hovenkamp, 2019 Colum Bus L Rev at 77–81 (cited in note 16). 
 129 Khan, The Supreme Court Just Quietly Gutted Antitrust Law (cited in note 97). 
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with no restraints on merchant pricing, price will be the marginal 
cost of providing groceries to each consumer—meaning the price 
for the card user will be adjusted to capture the extra $1.78  
in processing fees. Antisteering provisions prohibit such price 
adjustment. 
The antisteering restraints at issue in AmEx mean that, 
practically, merchants that accept credit cards must decide from 
a set of second-best alternatives: They can price as they would 
have if transaction costs were zero and pay transacting fees out 
of their revenue; they can lower prices and hope sales volume, and 
thus profits, will rise enough to cover their transacting costs; or 
they can raise prices for all consumers, regardless of the payment 
instrument used. They could also refuse to accept cards issued by 
high-cost networks, but merchants argue that this is a false 
choice because they risk losing their consumer base if they do not 
accept rewards cards. It is especially difficult to reject AmEx 
cards because AmEx’s business model is premised on providing 
valuable rewards to wealthy consumers who transact frequently. 
This is an especially important customer segment for merchants. 
Importantly, the option unavailable to merchants is price differ-
entiation depending on the kind of card consumers use. 
Profit margins in the retail industry average around 2 per-
cent.130 Credit interchange rates for grocers are also in the range 
of 1–1.5 percent for basic cards, and even higher for rewards 
cards.131 This means that interchange is a very large portion of 
retail margins—in many cases, their second-highest cost of oper-
ating after labor132—so simply paying transaction fees out of prof-
its is not a viable option for retailers.133 Instead, as merchants 
 
 130 Damodaran, Margins by Sector (cited in note 24). 
 131 See Mastercard 2018–2019 U.S. Region Interchange Programs and Rates *2 
(Mastercard, Apr 13, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/9KH2-VP7L; Visa USA Inter-
change Reimbursement Fees: Visa Supplemental Requirements at *7 (cited in note 78). 
 132 Brief of Amicus Curiae Retail Litigation Center, Inc. in Support of Petitioners, 
Ohio v American Express Co, No 16-1454, *11 (US filed July 6, 2017) (Retail Litigation 
Center Brief) (citations omitted), quoting American Express Co, 88 F Supp 3d at 221: 
“The costs associated with accepting credit and charge cards are among many 
merchants’ highest,” as the district court found after extensive testimony. Mer-
chants pay billions of dollars in fees each year to accept credit cards. An airline 
testified that its credit card costs were twice as much as its domestic labor costs. 
Ikea testified that the only costs that exceed credit card costs are labor, adver-
tising, and rent. 
 133 Empirically, evidence suggests that when merchants accept payment cards, they 
raise prices. See Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant 
Restraints, 45 Harv J Legis 1, 28 (2008) (“The limited empirical evidence on how products 
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themselves point out, these high costs of interchange are “re-
flected” in the high retail prices that consumers pay.134 
The inability to adjust prices to reflect the costs of inter-
change harms consumers in two ways. First, within the credit 
card transaction, card users are “deprived of the right, as eco-
nomic actors, to decide for themselves whether the benefit of re-
wards is worth increased prices.”135 Practically, this leads to an 
overuse of credit cards because consumers do not internalize the 
actual cost of credit when making the transacting decision. Pro-
fessor Adam Levitin makes this point: “[C]onsumers never inter-
nalize the costs of their choice of payment system. Merchant re-
straints thus encourage more credit card transactions at higher 
price than would occur in a perfectly efficient market.”136 
Second, restraints on merchant price discrimination harm 
consumers because they lead to cross subsidization by those who 
transact with cheaper payment instruments (cash, check, debit) 
of those who transact with credit, who tend to be richer and more 
financially sophisticated.137 
The cross subsidization of credit users by their non-credit 
counterparts has devastating consequences. It is regressive: in 
the extreme, “a lower-income shopper who pays for his or her gro-
ceries with cash or through [food stamps] . . . is subsidizing, for 
example, the cost of the premium rewards conferred by American 
Express on its relatively small, affluent cardholder base.”138 The 
magnitude of this cross subsidy is significant; every year, house-
holds who earn more than $150,000 annually receive an esti-
mated subsidy of $756 from households earning less than $20,000 
through credit card rewards.139 But the harm to these consumers 
from contractual and legal barriers to differentiated retail pricing 
cannot be captured by antitrust analysis because they are outside 
of the credit card market, however broadly it is defined.140 
 
are priced indicates that when merchants accept credit cards, they are likely to raise prices 
for all consumers, and that this creates a highly regressive cross-subsidization among  
consumers.”) 
 134 Retail Litigation Center Brief at *11 (cited in note 132). 
 135 Id at *12. 
 136 Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Re-
straints, 55 UCLA L Rev 1321, 1404–05 (2008). 
 137 Id at 1356. 
 138 American Express Co, 88 F Supp 3d at 216–17. 
 139 Kristina Cooke, Credit Card Fees Transfer Wealth to Rich, Study Finds (Reuters, 
July 26, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/98XM-56ZM. 
 140 Perhaps because they use cash or debit cards, which are substitutes for credit, 
they “count” from the perspective of the antitrust inquiry. But even the consideration of 
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The cross subsidization by cash and check consumers of their 
credit counterparts means that, absent any antitrust considera-
tions, the merchant restraints at the heart of the AmEx decision 
can be reined in on consumer protection grounds.141 
B. UDAAP Authority 
Section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the CFPB with 
the authority to intervene to prohibit “unfair, deceptive, or abu-
sive acts or practices” (UDAAPs).142 Practices can be unfair, de-
ceptive, and abusive, but each is governed by a different standard. 
If the CFPB observes a UDAAP, it can proceed by commencing 
litigation in a federal court or before an administrative law judge 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.143 
1. Unfair practices.  
An act or practice is unfair when (1) it “causes or is likely to 
cause substantial injury to consumers,” (2) the injury “is not rea-
sonably avoidable by consumers,” and (3) the “injury is not out-
weighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competi-
tion.”144 Substantial injury typically means monetary harm, and 
 
substitutes is not as a potential source of consumer harm; but instead whether considera-
tion of a properly defined group of substitutes “might strengthen or weaken any inference 
of power drawn from market share.” Hovenkamp, 2019 Colum Bus L Rev at 59 (cited in 
note 16). 
 Large merchants are opting out of the settlement with Visa and Mastercard to sue for 
the right to accept basic cards and reject rewards cards, focusing precisely on this issue: 
Amazon and Target have a surprising argument to make: The proliferation of 
rewards-rich credit cards is bad for consumers. They are suing for the right to 
pick and choose which Visa and Mastercards they accept. They want to be able 
to reject the richest rewards cards—cards like Chase Sapphire Reserve, which 
offer generous cash back, points, and other perks, and which come with the high-
est transaction fees charged to merchants. They say, if they obtain this right, 
they’ll be able to charge lower prices to shoppers. 
Josh Barro, Are Other People’s Credit-Card Rewards Costing You Money? Amazon and 
Other Retailers Believe So, and They’re Going to War Against High-End Cards (New York 
Magazine, Oct 16, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/B2RS-XYSC. 
 141 Professor Levitin alludes to this in Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Cards: 
“Although merchant restraints should be banned on antitrust grounds alone, there is also 
a separate consumer protection and social policy case to be made against them.” Levitin, 
45 Harv J Legis at 27 (cited in note 133). 
 142 See 12 USC § 5531. 
 143 Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 
Rev Bank & Fin L, 321, 358 (2013). 
 144 12 USC § 5531(c)(1)(A)–(B). 
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a risk of concrete harm is often sufficient to merit UDAAP inter-
vention.145 These injuries cannot be offset by countervailing bene-
fits, which could include “lower prices to the consumer or a wider 
availability of products and services.”146 
CFPB enforcement actions shed light on the types of practices 
that are considered unfair. In one case, the CFPB alleged that GE 
Capital engaged in an unfair practice by failing to ensure its sub-
sidiaries accurately conveyed information about the cost of credit 
(they misstated the terms of promotional credit offerings).147 In 
another, JPMorgan engaged in an unfair practice by selling 
“Identity Protection Products” in which the bank, through third-
party vendors, monitors information reported at credit agen-
cies.148 Many consumers who bought the product did not complete 
enrollment and so were paying for a product without receiving its 
benefits.149 In yet another enforcement action, the CFPB con-
tended that AmEx unfairly marketed its “Lost Wallet” products.150 
These too required additional activation, and yet, although initial 
solicitation calls were made in Spanish to Puerto Rican custom-
ers, follow-up materials were sent only in English.151 Conse-
quently, only 40 percent of customers who enrolled registered any 
additional items.152 
These examples suggest how merchant restraints can be 
challenged as “unfair” card network practices as well as the pitfalls 
of this approach. On the one hand, these examples demonstrate 
that the standard for “substantial injury . . . not reasonably avoid-
able” is a broad one.153 The CFPB successfully relied on this au-
thority to enter into consent orders with substantial financial 
penalties and new industry requirements even in cases when 
 
 145 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Prac-
tices *2 (Oct 1, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/4BW3-M8QH. 
 146 Id at *3. 
 147 Consent Order, In the Matter of GE Capital Retail Bank, CareCredit LLC, No 2013-
CFPB-0009, *2–6 (CFPB filed Dec 10, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/QQP2-4JVF. 
 148 Consent Order, In the Matter of JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA and Chase Bank USA, 
NA, No 2013-CFPB-0007, *3–5 (CFPB filed Sept 19, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 
WL 9008326). 
 149 Id at *4–5. 
 150 Consent Order, In the Matter of American Express Centurion Bank Salt Lake City, 
Utah, No 2013-CFPB-0011, *4–10 (CFPB filed Dec 24, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 
2013 WL 9008329). 
 151 Id at *9–10. 
 152 Id at *10. 
 153 See 12 USC § 5531(c)(1)(A). 
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harm seems to be reasonably avoidable, for example by complet-
ing enrollment to activate products purchased.154 
Substantial harm often means monetary harm. Antisteering 
provisions cause substantial harm to consumers in the credit card 
market because these consumers lose out on the opportunity to 
bargain with merchants to capture the surplus from lower inter-
change costs.155 They also cause substantial harm to consumers 
outside the credit card market. These monetary losses are quan-
tifiable: the average consumer whose income is less than $20,000 
loses more than $20 annually from restrictions on differential 
pricing for payment instruments.156 The six largest card issuers 
spend around $25 billion per year on credit card rewards.157 This 
is a direct transfer to the wealthy, who transact with these cards 
and receive generous kickbacks from the poor, who do not. 
Two aspects of the analysis will be less clear-cut. First, when 
a financial institution practice is targeted as unfair, the inquiry 
tends to focus on whether substantial harm is caused to the con-
sumer of the allegedly unfair product. There does not appear to be 
precedent for a practice being unfair for the substantial harm it 
imposes on consumers generally rather than those specifically in 
a product market. Second, it will be challenging to weigh this sub-
stantial harm against the benefits that accrue to consumers in 
this market in the form of credit card rewards. Doing so will be a 
novel use of UDAAP authority, but the CFPB can argue that the 
relevant consumer can be outside of the direct credit card trans-
action being regulated. For that consumer, there will be no need 
to weigh countervailing benefits because that consumer defini-
tionally cannot avail herself of any of the benefits of rewards 
cards if she is transacting with a payment method (cash, check, 
debit card) that is cheaper for merchants to process. Theoreti-
cally, the consumer could avoid this harm by herself transacting 
with a rewards cards, but this seems unlikely to meet the “rea-
sonable avoidance” threshold because many of the harmed con-
sumers do not qualify for attractive rewards cards. 
 
 154 See Consent Order, In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA at *4–5 (cited in note 148). 
 155 See Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust at *11–12 (cited in note 16). 
 156 See Cooke, Credit Card Fees Transfer Wealth to Rich, Study Finds (cited in 
note 139). 
 157 Spending on Credit Card Rewards Has Exploded (cited in note 28). 
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2. Deceptive practices. 
An alternative is the use of authority to regulate deceptive 
practices. This is the most commonly cited UDAAP that prompts 
CFPB enforcement actions,158 but it is less obvious how this au-
thority applies in the merchant restraint context. A practice is 
deceptive when there is a “representation, omission, act, or prac-
tice that misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer.”159 Exam-
ples include material misrepresentations, such as advertising 
that insurance would cost “only a few pennies a day” when the 
average cost is $12.55;160 enrolling consumers in add-on credit of-
ferings without obtaining clear affirmative consent and providing 
information about the terms and conditions of the product;161 or 
misrepresenting to consumers that they are receiving a “courtesy 
call” when in reality the bank is making an outbound sales call.162 
In the merchant restraint context, card networks are not misrep-
resenting processing costs to either merchants or consumers. 
Some card networks, like American Express, tend to be less 
public about the rates they charge merchants that accept their 
cards. This could potentially give the CFPB grounds for action 
because, historically, omissions can be deceptive as well: omitting 
the material fact that enrolling in “Payment Protection” or “Iden-
tity Theft Protection” programs constituted agreement to pur-
chase these products constitutes a deceptive act;163 so too does tell-
ing consumers a promotional card is a “no interest” card rather 
than a deferred-interest card.164 However, this can be compli-
cated, as it is unclear that withholding a price from consumers 
causes harm in the same way telling consumers “a card has no 
interest” rather than “requires deferred interest payments” does. 
Even if made aware of the price to the merchant of transacting 
 
 158 See Levitin, 32 Rev Bank & Fin L at 365 (cited in note 143). 
 159 CFPB, Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or Practices at *5 (cited in note 145). 
 160 Consent Order, In re Dealers’ Financial Services, LLC, Lexington, Kentucky, 
No 2013-CFPB-0004, *5 (CFPB filed June 26, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 
9008325). 
 161 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Marketing of Credit Card Add-on Prod-
ucts, CFPB Bulletin 2012-06 *1 (July 18, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/3B64-GQ28. 
 162 Joint Consent Order, Order for Restitution, and Order to Pay Civil Monetary Pen-
alty, In the Matter of Discover Bank, Greenwood, Delaware, No FDIC-11-548b; FDIC-11-
551K; 2012-CFPB-0005, *3 (FDIC & CFPB filed Sept 24, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 
2012 WL 11430188). 
 163 Id at *1–3. 
 164 Consent Order, In the Matter of GE Capital Retail Bank at *3 (cited in note 147). 
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with this payment instrument, absent any ability of the mer-
chants to surcharge them for the processing costs, this omission 
does not cause the card-using consumer direct harm. In fact, the 
card-using consumer benefits relative to those who transact with 
other payment methods because she receives rewards. 
Interestingly, some contend that price differentiation by mer-
chants may be deceptive to consumers. For example, if a sticker 
price listed the cash price of a product, but the merchant was per-
mitted to (and chose to) surcharge consumers, the surprise up-
charge for credit consumers may be deceptive. These worries are 
overstated.165 Should this be a concern, there is a relatively 
straightforward “fix”: the approach taken in New York is that 
merchants can surcharge only if they post the cash price of goods 
without also posting the higher (surcharge) price charged to 
credit customers.166 
3. Abusive authority.  
Dodd-Frank makes it unlawful for service providers to en-
gage in “abusive” acts or practices that “materially interfere[ ] 
with the ability of” consumers to understand terms of consumer 
financial products or take unreasonable advantage of “a lack of 
understanding on the part of the consumer.”167 The abusive prong 
is the most “novel” of the CFPB UDAAP authorities.168 Some ar-
gue it “opens wide all manner of after-the-fact excuses for rewrit-
ing conditions of transactions entered into by customers who had 
complete information and competitive alternatives.”169 In reality, 
most “abusive” practices also tend to be either unfair or deceptive, 
 
 165 Said another way by Levitin, “Ultimately, however, this argument should be re-
jected as a red herring. Consumers deal with such price differentials on a regular basis. 
Consumers constantly confront sales, coupons, and special offers.” Levitin, 45 Harv J Legis 
at 21 (cited in note 133). 
 166 Barbara S. Mishkin, Parties in Case Challenging Constitutionality of NY “No 
Credit Card Surcharge” Law Jointly Seek Dismissal of Complaint and Appeal (JDSupra, 
Jan 11, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/7PUJ-3ZSK. This is an interesting resolution 
in this case. Merchants are free to surcharge consumers as long as they post baseline and 
surcharge prices; but the state’s anti-surcharge law remains on the books and is not over-
turned as an unconstitutional infringement on free speech. 
 167 12 USC § 5531(d). 
 168 See Levitin, 32 Rev Bank & Fin L at 337 (cited in note 143). 
 169 Id at 337 n 84 (quoting Leslie R. Andersen of the American Bankers Association). 
In fact, recently former CFPB Director Mick Mulvaney commenced rulemaking requiring 
that the CFPB define the abusive standard as he proclaimed that “[r]egulation by enforce-
ment is done.” Hannah Lang, CFPB Writing Rule to Define “Abusive” Standard: Mulvaney 
(American Banker, Oct 15, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/7F64-TZZA. 
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making this prong operationally less important than critics  
contend.170 
In our particular setting, it is conceivable that an abusive 
practices argument could be made against surcharge restraints. 
The structure of interchange markets mean that consumers pay 
higher retail costs because they (collectively, as a group) do not 
understand the costs of payment processing. This may lead to so-
cially inefficient overuse of credit cards. Since credit cards link 
transacting and borrowing, the result could be more indebtedness 
than a consumer who understood the full cost of credit transact-
ing would undertake. However, surcharging restraints are not as 
obviously “abusive” as they are “unfair.” 
V.  CAVEATS 
Even if consumer protection authority can be used to tackle 
card network prohibitions on surcharging—like the antisteering 
provisions at the heart of AmEx—limits on the ability of mer-
chants to pass processing costs through to consumers remain, 
both legally and practically. 
A. Legal Restraints on Surcharging 
Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act171 permit mer-
chants to offer discounts for not transacting with credit cards.172 
In contrast, federal law previously banned surcharging for card 
usage explicitly, arguing that this ban is necessary to “allow[ ] the 
competitive free market to operate” and prevent consumer exploi-
tation, so that the price they see posted is the one they pay and 
there is no possibility of being surprised at the register.173 Although 
this surcharge ban expired in the 1980s,174 several states enacted 
their own statutes to make it challenging for merchants to price 
differentially. 
 
 170 Adam J. Levitin, CFPB “Abusive” Rulemaking? (Credit Slips, Oct 17, 2018), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/RQQ5-LDWR. Levitin pointed out when Mulvaney announced 
the rule-making that “the CFPB has brought some 206 enforcement actions to date. Of 
these, the CFPB brought ‘abusive’ claims in only 27 cases, and in all but one of those cases, 
the actions alleged to be abusive were also alleged to be either unfair or deceptive.” Id. 
 171 Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (Truth in Lending Act), Pub L No 90-
321, 82 Stat 146 (1968), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1601 et seq. 
 172 Kitch, 6 J L Econ & Org at 226 (cited in note 90). 
 173 Id at 227, quoting S Rep No 97-23, 97th Cong, 1st Sess 4 (1981), reprinted in 1981 
USCCAN 74, 77. 
 174 Kitch, 6 J L Econ & Org at 226–28 (cited in note 90). 
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Today, these statutes are on the books in eleven jurisdictions: 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, and Puerto Rico.175 
Interestingly, ten states (many of these same surcharge banners) 
explicitly allow consumers to receive discounts for cheaper pay-
ment instruments like cash (already permitted at the federal 
level), debit card, or check.176 
Economically the surcharge versus discount debate is puz-
zling because there is no distinction between these pricing prac-
tices. If a pair of shoes costs $100, and one customer buys shoes 
with cash (no interchange fee) and another with credit ($2 inter-
change fee), the merchant receives only $98 from the card-paying 
customer but the full $100 from the cash payer. The merchant 
could set the $100 price and pass the cost of interchange to the 
card payer through a surcharge of $2, or list the price as $102 and 
give $2 as a discount to the cash payer. In a world where mer-
chant discounts for transacting with low-cost payment instru-
ments are permissible, it is not obvious that legal restraints on 
surcharges for transacting with high-cost payment instruments 
are relevant. 
Yet some consumer advocates argue that merchants are more 
reluctant to offer discounts than charge surcharges because, un-
der a discount system, they must advertise a higher credit price; 
under a surcharge system, they can advertise a lower cash 
price.177 They further assert that consumers’ behavioral responses 
show that discounting and surcharging are not equivalent: be-
cause of loss aversion, consumers react more to potential losses, 
and so “credit-card surcharges are more effective than cash dis-
counts at discouraging credit-card use among consumers.”178 This 
perhaps explains why, in the United States, discounts for trans-
acting with cheaper forms of payment are uncommon, despite be-
ing legal. The exception to this general trend is the gasoline in-
dustry, in which cash discounts are commonplace. 
 
 175 Credit or Debit Card Surcharges Statutes (National Conference of State Legisla-
tures, Oct 13, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/TGW8-ME8Z. 
 176 California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma, 
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming (as well as Puerto Rico). Id. 
 177 See Kitch, 6 J L Econ & Org at 225 (cited in note 90). 
 178 Expressions Hair Design v Schneiderman, 808 F3d 118, 122 (2d Cir 2015). 
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B. Practical Difficulties with Surcharging 
It is worth noting that, even as we advocate for consumer pro-
tection authority to be used to provide merchants the ability to 
surcharge those who transact with expensive rewards cards, it is 
not obvious how consumers will respond to such differential pric-
ing. Many argue consumers respond more to potential losses and 
so are most likely to switch to forms of payment with low or no 
merchant processing fees (for example, cash) when they are told 
that they will be up-charged rather than told that they will re-
ceive discounts.179 
However, when merchants are permitted to surcharge, they 
tend to be slow to do so. In Australia, the Reserve Bank removed 
impediments to surcharging in 2003; yet by 2006, only 7 percent 
of merchants surcharged consumers, due to fear of “public back-
lash” and “reputation[al] damage.”180 In the United States, de-
spite settlements with Visa and Mastercard that allow surcharg-
ing to some extent, large merchants like The Home Depot, 
Walmart, and Target are explicit that they have no plans to in-
crease prices for credit users because doing so feels punitive and 
is likely to drive away customers.181 A restaurant executive voiced 
the following concern: “[C]ustomers might see it as another way 
you’re trying to get at them.”182 Instead of surcharging credit us-
ers, he suggested that “you have to take the [interchange] hit, or 
make it up by adjusting your prices.”183 
  
 
 179 Id. 
 180 Joanna Stavins and Huijia Wu, Payment Discounts and Surcharges: The Role of 
Consumer Preferences *3 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research Department Working 
Paper No 17-4, Feb 14, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/323Z-ULPJ. 
 181 See Lorraine Mirabella and Eileen Ambrose, Retailers May Charge Fee to Custom-
ers Paying with Credit Cards (Baltimore Sun, Feb 24, 2013), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/MBY4-Z3MC. 
 182 Stephanie Clifford and Stephanie Strom, Merchants Considering Credit Card Sur-
charges (NY Times, July 16, 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/5QFE-NM98. 
 183 Id. 
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Survey evidence confirms that merchants are appropriately 
skeptical of the desirability of surcharging. Consumers were 
asked versions of the following two questions: 
1. Imagine that you are planning to buy $10 (or $100, de-
pending on the survey variant) of groceries with a credit 
card. The grocer tells you that if you pay in cash instead, 
you will receive a 5% discount. 
2. Imagine that you are planning to buy $10 (or $100, de-
pending on the survey variant) of groceries with a credit 
card. The grocer tells you that if you pay with a credit 
card, a 5% surcharge will be added to your bill.184 
If you do not have cash, how will you pay? (Figures 4 and 5 below) 
If you have cash, how will you pay? (Figures 6 and 7 below) 
  
 
 184 It is important to point out that these are not perfectly economically equivalent 
cases. In the first question, the cheaper option is paying with cash, which results in gro-
ceries costing $95, versus $100 with a credit card. In the second question, the cheaper 
option means that groceries cost $100, versus $105 with a credit card. The dollar savings 
are of course identical in both cases. I chose this option rather than alternatives, for ex-
ample, “You are planning to buy $95 of groceries. The grocer tells you that if you pay with 
cash, a $5 surcharge will be added to your bill.” The issue with this approach is that survey 
respondents may (mistakenly) believe that a $5 flat fee is the consequence of credit usage, 
which is a much more punitive surcharge than a 5 percent fee. 
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FIGURE 4: NO CASH, RESPONSE TO 5% DISCOUNT/SURCHARGE, 
ALL PURCHASES185 




 185 Note: Author’s calculations. Survey results from Mechanical Turk survey of nearly 
1,300 consumers in the United States (data on file with author). 
 186 Note: Author’s calculations. Survey results from Mechanical Turk survey of nearly 
1,300 consumers in the United States (data on file with author). 
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Consumer responses reveal interesting patterns that illus-
trate the complexity of surcharging in practice. Recall that sur-
charging credit users and giving cash payers a cash discount are 
economically equivalent. However, almost all consumers who 
miss out on the discount are unbothered and complete their trans-
actions using available credit cards, despite missing out on a 
5 percent discount: Fewer than 3 percent leave the store without 
completing their transaction because they will miss out on a cash 
discount. In contrast, nearly 20 percent of consumers leave the 
store rather without completing their transaction if it results in a 
5 percent surcharge. 
As such, merchants are correctly concerned that surcharging 
means losing customers, at least in a world where surcharging is 
not universal. The unpopularity of surcharging is interesting 
given the tremendous investment by merchants to fight anti-
surcharging statutes in credit card contracts as well as state and 
federal laws. One plausible rationale is that surveys of consumers 
today capture reaction to current pricing practices where mer-
chants rarely surcharge consumers; consumers can therefore 
avoid rare surcharges by purchasing from a different merchant. 
If surcharging becomes the norm, however, credit users will have 
no choice but to bear higher fees or switch payment instruments. 
This is substantially the case in Australia,187 and was also in 
Europe until recent regulation.188 However, if large domestic re-
tailers shy away from differential pricing for fear of antagonizing 
their customers, it is possible that more aggressive interven-
tions—like banning the consumer loyalty programs that precipi-
tate use of expensive payment instruments—may be justified. 
 
 187 Despite the slow introduction of surcharging, by 2010, nearly 40 percent of large 
Australian merchants surcharged consumers using credit. See Stavins and Wu, Payment 
Discounts and Surcharges: The Role of Consumer Preferences at *3 (cited in note 180). 
 188 Recent regulation banned surcharging but also capped credit interchange rates at 
levels significantly below those that prevail in the United States. See Claer Barrett, Credit 
Card Surcharge Ban Comes into Force (Fin Times, Jan 12, 2018), online at 
https://www.ft.com/content/e1bdfc9a-f6f7-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00 (visited Jan 31, 2020) 
(Perma archive unavailable). See also All You Need to Know About the EU Interchange 
Cap (Adyen, Oct 14, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/83VX-72MY. 
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FIGURE 6: HAVE CASH, RESPONSE TO 5% DISCOUNT/SURCHARGE, 
ALL PURCHASES189 





 189 Note: Author’s calculations. Survey results from Mechanical Turk survey of nearly 
1,300 consumers in the United States (data on file with author). 
 190 Note: Author’s calculations. Survey results from Mechanical Turk survey of nearly 
1,300 consumers in the United States (data on file with author). 
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Economists and antitrust scholars have long debated how 
best to assess competition in two-sided markets, which are dis-
tinct from traditional markets because platforms must choose 
both a price and a price structure. Practically, in two-sided mar-
kets, high or rising prices on one side of the market are not nec-
essarily indicative of an anticompetitive market failure. Instead, 
consideration of total revenue and total cost on both sides of the 
market is necessary, lest we mistakenly apply one-sided logic to 
two-sided markets. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in AmEx embraced this 
broader market definition, shifting the antitrust paradigm for 
platform cases. Despite resounding criticism by eminent antitrust 
scholars, AmEx is law and makes it unlikely that antitrust is the 
most promising tool to rein in two-sided platforms going forward. 
This Essay advocates that, at least in the payments market, 
consumer protection authority is best equipped to tame this two-
sided market. Dodd-Frank provided the CFPB with broad author-
ity to restrict “unfair, abusive, or deceptive” acts and practices. 
The antisteering provisions at the heart of AmEx are unfair both 
to consumers in the credit card market—who lose out on potential 
retail savings from using lower-interchange cards—and consum-
ers outside of the credit card market, who subsidize the rewards 
that credit users receive. This regressive cross subsidization is an 
important consequence of card networks’ pricing practices, but 
one that antitrust necessarily ignores in its focus on narrowly de-
fined product markets. 
Of course, the payments market is but one example of a two-
sided platform implicated by the Court’s recent decision in AmEx. 
It will be harder to bring antitrust cases against Uber, eBay, and 
Amazon as well, or against essentially any two-sided market 
where there is a “simultaneous transaction” that links both sides. 
The CFPB’s authority is not a panacea because its power is lim-
ited to providers of consumer financial services. 
That said, the general push of this Essay—to broaden our 
conception of a two-sided market—applies to platforms beyond 
payment networks. Just as it is a mistake to consider one-side of 
a two-sided market in isolation, it is a mistake to think of one set 
of consumers in isolation. Determining whether a market is well 
or poorly functioning requires engaging with externalities—both 
positive and negative—on consumers outside of the market. Con-
sumer protection, rather than competition policy, is well suited to 
this far-reaching analysis. 
